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Justice, Power, and the Realities of
Interdependence: Lessons from the
Milogevit and Hussein Trials
Payam Akhavant
"You shall not render an unjust judgment; you shall not be partial to the
poor or defer to the great: with justice you shall judge your neighbour."
(Leviticus 19:15)
On September 30, 1992, I attended a fateful meeting at the Intercontinental Hotel in Zagreb, Croatia. A recent graduate of law school, I felt privileged to be part of a high-level diplomatic mission entrusted with
investigating humanitarian law violations in the former Yugoslavia. We
had been dispatched by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) 1 in response to the horrific accounts of "ethnic cleansing"
that had shattered Europe's post-Cold War euphoria. Like many others, I
was outraged by the radical evil unfolding in the Balkans, and in my youth-

ful idealism I wanted justice to be done. Yet, as Ambassador Hans Corell of
Sweden opened the meeting, there was a feeling that we were unwitting
participants in a political farce. The specter of genocide once again
haunted Europe and there was no resolve to intervene.

If anything,

Slobodan Milogevit was considered indispensable to stability in the
Balkans and appeasement of his regime was the prevailing policy. Against
this backdrop I felt somehow that our mission was merely a pretension of
concern.
It was apparent from the outset that given the scale of the atrocities,
the conventional model of human rights reporting was grossly inadequate.
The shield of state sovereignty had to be pierced and the perpetrators held
individually accountable for their crimes. This was an ambitious undertaking in an entrenched culture of impunity that had countenanced the
likes of Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and Mengistu. The report's recommendation
that an international criminal tribunal be established was greeted with
skepticism by some, with ridicule by others. Nonetheless, soon after, as
pressure mounted to "do something", or to appear to be doing something,
the United Nations Security Council established a Commission of Experts,
followed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in May 1993. When I joined the ICTY Prosecutor's Office in its
very first days, the war was still raging and the nascent institution's success
t SJ.D., Senior Fellow, Yale Law School, Cornell International Law Journal, Spring
Symposium 2005, "Milogevit and Hussein on Trial" Ithaca, 25 February 2005
1. Now known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).
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was far from certain. The Prosecutor's Office had no budget, no staff, and
above all, no Prosecutor had yet been appointed. While eleven prominent
judges were paraded before television cameras to create the image of a
court in action, the docket was empty and unlikely to be filled any time
soon. As the first Legal Advisor, instead of historical grandeur, I felt
despair that beyond lowly war criminals like Dugko Tadit, the grand conspirators of ethnic cleansing would never be captured. There was a manifest contradiction between a peace process that ratified territorial gains
made by "ethnic cleansing" and a justice process aimed at prosecuting the
very same crimes. This was no Nuremberg Tribunal. It was like threatening Hitler with prosecution while acquiescing in the annexation of Poland.
At the outset, the ICTY was either relegated to a mere bargaining chip
with warlords, or dismissed as an impediment to the peace process. After
all, what incentive would leaders have to end the war if they faced prosecution at the end? Naive idealism, the political realists told us, must give way
to "power realities." This conception of realism reflected a current of
thought dating back to antiquity. It called to mind the Athenians pronouncement to the Melians in The PeloponnesianWar that "the standard of
justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they
have to accept."'2 This, however, was not the world of antiquity. It was the
world of the late twentieth century, a world in which the futility of divisive
ideologies at whose altar millions were sacrificed had led to a gradual
acceptance of international cooperation, an emerging albeit grudging consciousness of humankind's inextricable interdependence, a world in which
events in the most remote reaches of the planet would have inevitable repercussions on all. In this world, the potential for perpetual instability in
Europe was also an ever-present reality, and the link between bringing ethnic demagogues to justice and a lasting peace was an inescapable fact.
Some mystified ethnic war in the Balkans as an expression of primordial
hatred, an inevitable "clash of civilizations" in which ethnic separation was
the only solution. But as United States Ambassador Warren Zimmerman
observed, instead of "spontaneous combustion" it was more accurate to say
that the conflagrations in former Yugoslavia were the work of "pyromaniacs," political elites who incited ethnic hatred and violence as an instrument of control. 3 The war was foremost about the seduction of absolute
power, and its instrument was the' political homogenization of a deceived
and fearful multitude against an imagined enemy. Conversely, the remarkable display of "people power" in the streets of Belgrade that precipitated
the downfall of Milo~evit demonstrated that this was not a war of peoples.
Rather, it was a war between ethnic fascism and multiethnic democracy, a
war where accountability was a vital antidote to tyranny founded on the
suppression of truth. Against this background, the disjunction between
2.
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realpolitik and justice was more a reflection of obsolete cynicism rather
than astute statesmanship. The ICTY succeeded beyond what any of us
had imagined because of the grudging realization that "soft power" in judicial guise was a significant instrument of post-conflict peace-building, the
benefits of which went far beyond the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia.
Beyond such pragmatic considerations there was another dimension
to interdependence, that of the relationship between justice for others and
our self-conception as liberal democracies, as civilized societies committed
to human rights. This political identity is a valuable cultural commodity, a
source of national self-confidence and the projection of influence abroad.
It is essential to the rationalization and legitimization of political systems,
elites, and priorities, even vital for satisfying the increasing demand for
inner meaning in an empty consumerist culture. What we call "power realities" are not immutable god-given phenomena as some would believe.
They are reflections of our identity, of what we stand for as a people, of
what we choose to prioritize in the democratic process, of whether our
votes are influenced more by the Monica Lewinsky scandal or the failure to
stop the Rwandan genocide. In this sense, our response to the cries of the
victims, the prosecution of war criminals, is also about the need to affirm
our self-conception, about the production of social meaning. But I have
come to see that the lines between compassion and condescension,
between empathy and exploitation, between genuine engagement and pretension of concern, are not always distinguishable. I have learned that the
image of justice in the eyes of those whom have lost all they had, for whom
residual human dignity is a last refuge, is of paramount importance if we
are committed to their empowerment through the restoration of lost
humanity.
As I became part of a self-contained war crimes industry, I found that
the suffering of others was often a platform for the self-serving demonstration of liberal virtue, or an opportunity to display academic brilliance,
political acumen, or bureaucratic prowess. Despite the pious incantations
and platitudes to the contrary, I found the victims often reduced to objects
of pity rather than human subjects whose voices should be heard. The
seduction of fame and career, the glamour of making history, of doing
something great, our self-glorification as heroes and saviors, all of these
impulses missed the deeper meaning of justice and the humility that it
demands of us. If there is any space for the cult of heroism, for celebration
of superhuman qualities, it should be reserved for those hapless people
who demonstrated the resilience of the human spirit against overwhelming
odds; those who struggled for daily survival during the siege of Sarajevo,
the bereaved mothers of Srebrenica who still search for the remains of their
sons, the girls of Fota who endured repeated rape and yet still had the
courage to testify against their tormentors, those who go on living despite
unbearable grief and anguish. It is in their presence that we find the best
proof of our inherent nobility, of the power of justice to redeem the shared
humanity that binds us together.
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On July 1, 2004, the morning that Saddam Hussein was to make his
first appearance in court, Ireceived a call from CNN Headline News. They
wanted someone to comment on this newsworthy spectacle and apparently
the caption "former U.N. prosecutor" made me eminently qualified. As I
rushed to the studio in Manhattan, I was at a loss as to what I should say.
It was not because I had nothing to say. On the contrary, I had too much to
say, and I could not reduce it to simplistic sound bytes. Unlike the former
Yugoslavia, Iraq was next door to my land of birth Iran, and the crimes of
Saddam and the history of his appeasement by the international community was in some way part of my personal universe. I commented in the
interview that Saddam was a heinous criminal whose prosecution was a
momentous occasion for introducing accountability for human rights violations in the Middle East. Inwardly, however, I had serious concerns as to
whether this opportunity would be squandered by manipulating the truth
for political ends. This I felt would discredit justice and breed cynicism in
the expectant eyes of people in the region. But the situation was rather
complex and could not easily be conveyed in sound bytes to a public with a
short and selective memory.
While most of the debate surrounding the Iraqi Special Tribunal had
revolved around fair trial guarantees or the qualification of judges, it was
prosecutorial independence and discretion that concerned me most. I had
learned in the ICTY the obvious fact that the choice of investigations ultimately determines the scope and content of the historical record produced
by legal proceedings. I also knew that the construction of the truth about
Saddam's Iraq, the exposition of the lessons learned from prosecution of
his regime's crimes, was no simple matter, not least because those who
now championed justice for the Iraqi people were once Saddam's apologists, going so far as to deny the genocide against the Kurds. In an interdependent world, the appeasement of power and the blatant disregard of
human rights had helped to create a monster who had come to haunt the
same forces that once befriended him.
This unfortunate past is perhaps best portrayed by the chemical attack
against the civilian population of Halabja on March 16, 1988, during the
Iran-Iraq war, an attack that in many respects embodied the evil of Saddam's regime and marked the early stages of the genocidal Anfal campaign
against Iraq's Kurdish people. In his 2003 State of the Union Address,
President Bush referred to this incident in justifying the invasion of Iraq:
"The dictator who is assembling the world's most dangerous weapons has
already used them on whole villages -leaving thousands of his own citizens
If this is not evil, then evil has no meandead, blind, or disfigured ....
ing."4 A glimpse of the horrors of what transpired in Halabja may explain
why I agree fully with this description of evil yet remain ambivalent about
whether the Iraqi Special Tribunal will be a befitting response to Saddam's
crimes.
4. President George W. Bush, State of the Union (Jan.28, 2003), available at: http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
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In early 1988, the Iran-Iraq war was approaching its climax. Iraq had
escalated the "War of the Cities" in order to force Iran to negotiate a
ceasefire. Starting on February 29, 1988, Iraq fired as many as 182 SCUD
missiles at Tehran over a fifty-two day period.5 Saddam had instigated the
war in September, 1980 with the occupation of Khoramshahr, which he
claimed for Iraq based on its predominantly Arabic ethnic composition.
Evoking the imagery of the Islamic conquest of Zoroastrian Persia by the
Arabs, and playing on the mythical division between Semitic Arabs and
Aryan Persians, he called the war Qadisiyyat Saddam in memory of the battle fought on the plains of that name in 636 A.D. Saddam was exploiting
the political upheaval of the 1979 revolution and the disintegration of the
Shah's army, but ultimately underestimated the unified nationalistic
response of Iranians, and the willingness of the Islamic Republic to use and
prolong the war as a means of consolidating the power of Iran's absolutist
theocracy. Kanan Makiya writes that contrary to popular belief, Iraq's
aggression "had nothing to do with rancour over possessions, competition
for economic assets, greed for territory, or alleged Iranian intentions ...
Saddam Husain's decision to wage war had an independent meaning to it
because it was so fundamentally gratuitous."6 The pinnacle of absolute
power, Makiya writes, "allowed the notoriously 'cautious' Saddam Husain
to translate well-founded self-confidence into megalomania. A demonstrably successful projection of Ba'thist power ... would have catapulted Saddam" to realize his fantasy of becoming the new Gamal Abd'ul Nasser,
leading the mythical Arab nation to glory and victory. 7 While the people of
Iran suffered terribly, the Islamic Republic exploited the outpouring of Iranian nationalism to crush internal political dissent in the name of the war
and revolution. Khomeini soon "elevated the war to the realm of the spiritual by converting a territorial invasion motivated by political ambition
into God's war against the infidel." 8
The war took a terrible toll. The Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery south of
Tehran is a chronicle of this tragedy that scarred an entire generation in
Iran. It is a seemingly endless city of death, containing some of the
750,000 Iranian casualties of this war. Framed portraits and personal articles litter the graves as reminders for those who still mourn their loss. Sandra Mackey, a Middle East expert, writes of her visit to Iran that:
Almost any Iranian can testify to personal loss. In a mud-walled house in a
small village, a woman wrapped in a chador drew deeply on a cigarette and
told me about her son who stepped on a mine. An engineer in his early
forties lost six cousins ranging in age from sixteen to forty-nine. A man
selling fresh pomegranates in the bazaar in Tehran wept about his fourteenyear-old who never returned from the front. And a young, melancholy busi-

5. See

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE

KURDS, at 102 n.19 (1993).
6. KANAN MAKIYA, REPUBLIC OF FEAR: THE POLITICS OF MODERN IRAQ 270, 272 (1989)
(using pseudonym Samir al-Khalil).
7. Id. at 273.
8. SANDRA MACKEY, THE IRANIANS: PERSIA, ISLAM AND THE SOUL OF A NATION 319

(1996).
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nessman described the day in 1988 when an Iraqi [SCUD] missile hit a
Tehran apartment house, killing his wife, the mother of his five-year-old
daughter. Those who survived the war's battlefields walk on crutches and
canes. They live their lives without sight. They sell cigarettes on the street
because a bullet in the head, too dangerous to remove, has closed the door
on real employment. Thousands more escaped physical injury but not
mental torture. Over and over, doctors and educators told me stories about a
whole generation of men whose minds more than their bodies are damaged
9
by war.
It was on March 13, 1988 that Iranian pasdaranRevolutionary Guards
and Kurdish peshmerga launched a joint attack against Iraqi forces to take
the strategically important town of Halabja. By March 15, the Iranian
forces were seen walking through the streets chanting "God is Great!
Khomeini is our Leader!" On March 16, the Iraqis counter-attacked with
conventional air strikes and artillery shelling. By around three o'clock that
afternoon, the villagers were overwhelmed by an unusual smell of garlic
and apples. An eyewitness named Nasreen explained how these smells
were carried into her house by the wind. When she checked on a caged
partridge in the house, she saw that the bird had fallen on its side and was
dying. She looked out the window: "It was very quiet, but the animals were
dying. The sheep and goats were dying." She ran into the cellar where her
family was sheltering from the bombardment and told everybody "[t]here
was something wrong with the air." Everybody panicked not knowing
what they should do. She felt a sharp pain in her eyes. "Then the children
started throwing up. They kept throwing up. They were in so much pain,
and crying so much. They were crying all the time. My mother was crying.
Then the old people started throwing up." Nasreen and her family decided
to escape from the cellar that had now been transformed into a gas chamber. "The leaves were falling off the trees, even though it was spring" she
recalled. "There were smoke clouds around, clinging to the ground." As
she ran, she saw people "lying frozen on the ground. There was a small
baby on the ground, away from her mother. I thought they were both sleeping. But she had dropped the baby and then died. And I think the baby
tried to crawl away, but it died, too." Another witness recalls that a woman
named Hamida tried to save her two-year old daughter "by allowing her to
nurse from her breast" thinking that this would spare her from breathing
the gas. "The baby's name was Dashneh" he recalled. "She nursed for a
long time. Her mother died while she was nursing. But she kept
nursing."' o
It is estimated that up to 5,000 civilians expired in this attack alone. It
was the first use of poison gas to exterminate women and children since
the gas chambers of the Holocaust. It was not to be the last as Ali Hassan
Al-Majid, otherwise known as "Chemical Ali", enthusiastically implemented Saddam's Anfal liquidation policy against the Kurds. Audiotapes

9. Id. at 332.
10. See Jeffrey Goldberg, The Great Terror, THE
52-54.

NEW YORKER,

Mar. 25, 2002, at
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of his remarks at Ba'ath Party meetings recovered by Human Rights Watch
in 1991 indicate that he had nothing to fear: "I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything? The international community? Fuck them! The international community and those who listen to
them.""I Why would Chemical Ali be so confident about committing
genocide with impunity?
During this period, the United States was preoccupied with containing
revolutionary Iran's ambitions and protecting oil supplies in the Persian
Gulf. According to a former government official, "[hiaving gone through
the 440 days of the hostage crisis in Iran ...

the period when we were the

Great Satan, if Iraq had gone down it would have had a catastrophic effect
on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the whole region might have gone
down."1 2 In the pursuit of this conception of the "national interest," Donald Rumsfeld had been dispatched as President Reagan's envoy to meet
with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in December 1983. He was instructed to
facilitate the restoration of diplomatic relations that had been severed earlier because of Iraq's support of terrorism. A now declassified message
from Rumsfeld to the State Department regarding the outcome of the meeting in Baghdad refers to the "obvious pleasure" of Saddam at a letter from
President Reagan and later to Rumsfeld's comment which indicated the
United States was opposed to an outcome of the war that "weakened Iraq's
role or enhanced interests and ambitions of Iran."' 13 The bilateral relationship was quickly strengthened. The United States soon began a covert program to provide Iraq with "critical battle planning assistance at a time
when American intelligence agencies knew that Iraqi commanders would
employ chemical weapons in waging the decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq
war."' 14 According to a New York Times article:
The covert program was carried out at a time when President Reagan's top
aides, including Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank
C. Carlucci, and Gen. Colin L. Powell, the national security adviser, were
publicly condemning Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially after Iraq
attacked Kurds in Halabja in March 1988.15

According to PBS Frontline, Washington Post, and Newsweek reports:
German, British, and American corporations sold Iraq military hardware,
arms technology, advanced computers, and key ingredients for the manufacture of missiles and chemical and biological weapons, with the active
approval of the U.S. government .... Among the items purchased by Iraq...
were American-built helicopters that were used, U.S. government officials
11. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 349.
12. Patrick E. Tyler, Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at Al.

13. Cable from Charles H. Price I, United States Embassy in United Kingdom, to the
Department of State, Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein [ [ 2, 14 (Dec. 21, 1983), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq31 .pdf.
14. Tyler, supra note 12 at Al.
15. Id.
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16
concluded, in poison gas attacks on the Kurds.

The Reagan and Bush administrations fought congressional efforts to
impose sanctions against Iraq for the mass-murder of Kurds in Halabja.
Sixty officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency continued to provide support for the classified program. According to a veteran of the program, the
Pentagon "wasn't so horrified by Iraq's use of gas ....
It was just another
way of killing people-whether with a bullet or phosgene, it didn't make
any difference."'1 7 Given the propaganda benefits of Halabja for Iran, the
Defense Intelligence Agency even took the extraordinary step of publishing
a report suggesting that Iran was responsible for the use of poison gas at
Halabja. Stephen Pelletiere, the senior CIA political analyst of Iraq during
the Anfal campaign and later a professor at the Army War College, was one
of the authors of this report, though he had no expertise in medical or
forensic sciences. In a disturbingly ironic twist, on January 31, 2003, the
New York Times published an op-ed piece by Pelletiere entitled "A War
Crime or An Act of War?" in which he argues remarkably that:
Before we go to war over Halabja, the administration owes the American people the full facts. And if it has other examples of Saddam Hussein gassing
Kurds, it must show that they were not pro-Iranian Kurdish guerrillas who
died fighting alongside Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Until Washington
gives us proof of Saddam Hussein's supposed atrocities, why are we picking
on Iraq on human rights grounds, particularly when there are so many other
repressive regimes Washington supports? 18
And what's more, many groups n the political left opposed to the
American invasion of Iraq seized on this article and invoked this shameful
attempt at genocide denial in their "anti-hegemonist" discourse to suggest
that President Bush's reference to Halabja in his 2003 State of the Union
speech was a lie. This sordid twisted tale of political cynicism helps
explain why Chemical Ali was so confident that he could commit genocide
with impunity. Perhaps it. also explains why Saddam was sufficiently
emboldened to invade Kuwait in 1990, given the unconditional support
that he received even as he exterminated his fellow citizens. It would not
be unreasonable to suggest that had the Iraqi Ba'athist regime continued to
act in furtherance of the American "national interest" we would not be seeing Ali Hassan A1-Majid standing trial for genocide before an Iraqi Special
Tribunal today.
This brings me to my ambivalence about an Iraqi Special Tribunal in
which investigations appear thus far to conveniently disregard Saddam's
crimes against the Iranian people, although crimes committed during the
occupation of Kuwait feature prominently. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated that initiating "a war of aggression ... is not
only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing
16. Leo Casey, Questioning Halabja: Genocide and the Expedient PoliticalLie, DISSENT
MAGAZINE, Summer 2003, at 62.

17. Tyler, supra note 12, at Al.
18. Stephen C. Pelletiere, Op-Ed., A War Crime or An Act of War?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2003, at A29.
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only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated
evil of the whole."' 19 Notwithstanding the debate about the definition of
the crime of aggression under international law, inclusion of the events
surrounding the invasion of Iran is essential to constructing an accurate
and representative historical record of Saddam's rise to absolute power and
his consequent repression of the Iraqi people. Excluding this episode of
state criminality would be the equivalent of the Nuremberg Judgment omitting Hitler's aggression against the eastern lands and the inextricable link
between external war and internal consolidation of authoritarian rule.
Beyond determination of individual guilt, the historical narrative that emanates from the Iraqi Special Tribunal should not only benefit the Iraqi people, but also the international community. Of course, it is more expedient
to construct a self-image as heroes and saviors rather than accomplices to
war crimes and genocide. Public exposure to the truth is, however, essential for a healthy democracy and if any lessons are to be learned about the
consequences of such cynicism on future relations with the Middle East,
there must be a genuine reckoning with the past.
The omission of Saddam's war against Iran in investigations at a time
when the United States is pre-occupied with Iranian containment fails to
distinguish between the Islamic Republic's conservative rulers on the one
hand, and the people of Iran on the other. Even those with a realist persuasion in foreign policy have come to realize the importance of supporting
the popular will in Iran. In proposing a "new approach" towards Iran that
emphasizes a "non-violent transition to democracy", the Committee on the
Present Danger, co-chaired by George Schultz and James Woolsey,
remarks: "Iran's people ... are our allies. They want to free themselves
from Khamenei's oppression and they want Iran to join the community of
prosperous, peaceful democracies."' 20 While there is indeed nothing like
living under an anti-American theocracy to make people pro-American, if
the people of Iran are considered allies would it not be in America's best
interests to recognize their suffering under Saddam's imposed war? Would
this not be a welcome expression of goodwill that would help win hearts
and minds? Would it not also provide an opening, an incentive for examination of the Islamic Republic's injustice against its own people at some
point in the future? Who will answer for the thousands of Basij child
soldiers from poor devout families in rural Iran who were used as human
minesweepers by the pasdaranRevolutionary Guards? These children are
also in the endless graves of Tehran's Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery, having sacrificed their lives in the belief that the imitation brass keys hung around
their neck would open the door to paradise in the afterlife. Beyond the war,
who will answer for the thousands upon thousands of dissidents who were
tortured behind the walls of Tehran's notorious Evin prison or those who
19. 22
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were hanged in public squares from cranes following summary show
trials?
Beyond the Iran-Iraq war, the impact of the Iraqi Special Tribunal and
a genuine U.S. commitment to accountability has far-reaching consequences on civil society and democracy in Iran, consequences that should
not be underestimated. This potential impact is recognized even by those
realist elements in the American political establishment who are not
known for a particularly strong commitment to human rights, or who view
Iran primarily if not exclusively through the prism of security rather than
justice and democracy. The Committee on the Present Danger observes,
for instance, that the April 1997 Mykonos trial in which a German court
implicated Iran's leaders in the assassination of Kurdish dissidents had an
important impact on Iranian opinion "contributing to the big vote for
Khatami that year, perceived as a reformer. ''2 1 The Committee even proposes that the United States "seek the cooperation of like-minded governments, leading toward creation of an international tribunal to try
Khamenei." 2 2 Nevertheless, it is one thing to pursue accountability for the
mere sake of political expedience, and yet another to pursue human rights
for its own sake. An indication that the United States is genuinely committed to accountability beyond narrow realpolitik considerations such as
nuclear containment or support for terrorism would greatly influence Iranian public opinion and civil society at a crucial moment in United StatesIran relations, and at a moment when the Iranian people and the international community are urgently attempting to further a non-violent and lasting transition to democracy in Iran.

The Milogevit and Hussein trials represent important milestones in
the tortuous historical path towards accountability for the most serious
international crimes. Despite their many shortcomings, these judicial
experiments mark a radical departure from the culture of impunity that
has prevailed for so long. Each involves a complex and multifaceted context requiring a tactful mediation between law and politics, a delicate balance between the global and local. Each contributes in its own measure to
the transformation of the boundaries of power and legitimacy in international affairs, to a subtle but far reaching socio-pedagogical process that
instills subliminal inhibitions against State criminality that induces a condition of habitual lawfulness. Military power can eliminate threats in the
short-term, but in an inextricably interdependent world, long-term peace
and stability can only be sustained by the power of legitimacy. If war
crimes trials are contaminated by selective prosecution and distortions of
the truth, if they become mere instruments of political expedience, the significant progress made in the past decade in establishing a credible system
of international criminal justice will be seriously undermined.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id.

